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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
EQUAL PROTECTION: Is There A Constitutional Right
To A Sewer?
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw1
Andrew Hawkins, a black citizen of the town of Shaw, Mississippi,
instituted a class action seeking injunctive relief against the town's
mayor, clerk and five aldermen under the Civil Rights Act of 1866,2
alleging discrimination against blacks because of their race in the
provision of municipal services.
Shaw is a small agricultural town in Mississippi with a relatively
static population.' The residential patterns are largely segregated, with
blacks concentrated in the older subdivisions and whites near the
central business district and in the outer areas of the town. Because
Shaw has no zoning laws, houses in the older areas are built on
extremely small lots fronting on streets and alleys of inadequate width.
In the provision of paved streets, the town initially paved the state
highways and the roads within the central business district and then
started to pave the outlying residential areas. This program, carried
on in a financially conservative manner, has not yet reached the
periphery of the town. The town has a history of paving in both black
and white residential areas, and in the past fifteen years, approximately
sixteen streets fronting on black homes have been paved. Most of
the streets in white neighborhoods are paved.
Prior to 1963, no municipally-operated sanitary sewer service was
provided. In that year, a modern system was installed, with lines to
most white neighborhoods and to the newer black neighborhoods which
had indoor plumbing. Shaw has no housing code requiring indoor
plumbing, and most of the older black neighborhoods do not have
such facilities. The residents of these areas have no access to sewers.
It has been the town's policy, however, to extend the system to all
who ask for it, and the majority of black citizens presently have access
to the municipal sewer.
1. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'g 303 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Miss. 1969),
aff'd en banc, No. 29013 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 1972).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 2, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
3. The description of the town is taken from the district court opinion. 303 F.
Supp. 1162 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
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Shortly before suit was filed, the town acquired new high intensity
mercury vapor street lights which were installed exclusively in the
central business district and white neighborhoods. Black neighborhoods
continue to be lighted by bare bulb fixtures.
Plaintiff alleged that, in all instances, whites had been favored in
the quality and quantity of services provided. These allegations were
supported by impressive statistical evidence which showed that ninety-
seven percent of the blacks' houses were located in neighborhoods
where no whites resided, and ninety-seven percent of the homes fronting
on unpaved streets were occupied by blacks. Furthermore, in the
provision of services, ninety-nine percent of the whites were served
by the sanitary sewers, while only eighty percent of the blacks were.
Additionally, all of the new street lights had been installed in white
neighborhoods. In the black neighborhoods, fire hydrants and traffic
control devices were poorly placed, drainage ditches were poor or
nonexistent, and the small diameter of water mains allegedly caused
inadequate water pressure under normal usage.
Despite these statistics, the district court found a rational basis
for each variance :" the paving had followed a rational nondiscrimina-
tory plan; the inferior drainage was caused by circumstances beyond
the power of municipal officials; the inadequate water pressure was
suffered by all and sewer service was provided to those who were
able to take advantage of it.
The Fifth Circuit reversed," finding that the statistics presented
a prima facie case of racial discrimination, which could only be
justified if the town could show a compelling interest in its manner
of apportioning services. The court concluded that since no such
compelling interest could possibly exist, the town would be required
to submit a plan to correct the imbalance.6 This judgment was
subsequently reaffirmed by the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc.7 While
the order issued in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw was probably fully
justified by the facts in the case, the legal reasoning used to reach
the decision was faulty in several respects. This case note will attempt
4. Id. at 1169.
5. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
6. Id. at 1293. The town was ordered to prepare a program of improvements
which would remove the disparities and to submit the plan to the court for approval.
7. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, No. 29013 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 1972). The later
opinion did not clearly adopt the reasoning of the original Fifth Circuit opinion as to
when to apply the compelling state interest test. The court as a whole instead stressed
the existence in Shaw of "neglect involving clear overtones of racial discrimination."
Id. at 3. The en banc opinion may be read to suggest a third equal protection test. See
part B3 infra.
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to describe the proper test for determining when denial of the right
to a sewer reaches constitutional proportions.
STANDARDS FOR REVIEW
The holding in Town of Shaw, that a municipality must allocate
its services impartially, is neither new nor unique. Although a city has
no obligation to provide any services, once it has undertaken so to
provide, it must do so in a nondiscriminatory manner.8  However,
this is not to say that all distinctions between citizens are forbidden.
It is clear that in providing any public service, distinctions may be
made on the basis of location, consumption or any other rational,
material difference which serves to distinguish the recipients.9
Furthermore, if the city is unable to provide services to all of its
inhabitants, it may furnish services to the extent of its resources.'"
It has traditionally been held that the equal protection clause of
the Constitution is not violated so long as any distinctions made by a
statute between individuals or groups are "reasonable, not arbitrary,
and . . . rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."" In other words, the
classification must be reasonably designed to promote a legitimate
governmental objective and must fairly carry out that objective. Thus,
in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York,' the Supreme Court
upheld a law which prohibited commercial advertising on vehicles
unless the product advertised was sold by the vehicle's owner, stating
that since the classification was reasonably related to the intended
8. This general rule was well stated in Reid Dev. Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills
Township, 10 N.J. 229, 89 A.2d 667 (1952), in which the court granted plaintiff a
writ of mandamus to compel the township to extend water mains, saying: "[I]t is
elementary that the exercise of the power [to provide services] must be in all respects
fair and reasonable and free from oppression. . . . There is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws unless the water service be available to all in like circumstances
upon the same terms and conditions .... 89 A.2d at 669. See also Construction &
Gen. Laborers Union, Local 563 v. St. Paul, 270 Minn. 427, 134 N.W.2d 26 (1905);
Samuels v. Town of Harrison, 195 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
9. Montgomery v. Greene, 187 Ala. 196, 65 So. 783 (1914) (water rates must be
uniform unless a physical difference justifies different rates) ; Arkansas Natural Gas
Co. v. Norton Co., 165 Ark. 172, 263 S.W. 775 (1924) (discrimination because of
location, consumption or other difference is permitted); Fretz v. Edmond, 66 Okla.
262, 168 P. 800 (1916) (discrimination in favor of public school is permitted in allo-
cation of water).
10. Cf. Schriver v. Mayor & City Council, 169 Md. 286, 181 A. 443 (1935).
11. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
12. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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purpose of promoting safety on the public highways, there was no
violation of the equal protection clause.1
3
Generally, any classification made by the state is presumed to be
valid, 4 and the burden of proving its invalidity rests squarely upon
the challenger.' To carry this burden, it is necessary that the challenger
prove that the classification is completely arbitrary and that it has
no reasonable relationship to any legitimate government interest.' 6
Within the realm of "traditional" equal protection analysis, there is
no necessity for the state to demonstrate affirmatively a rational basis
for a challenged statute, because the Supreme Court has implied that
a classification will be upheld if "any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.' ' 7
A more stringent standard of review is invoked, however, when
a statutory classification is based upon some suspect criterion, such
as race,' 8 or infringes upon a constitutionally protected right.'" In
either of these situations, the presumption of validity vanishes, and
the state is required to sustain the burden of justifying its law on
the basis of a compelling state interest.20 To meet its burden in such
a case, the state must prove not only that its objective could not be
accomplished without making some racial or other suspect distinctions,2 '
but also that the public interest to be promoted outweighs the adverse
effects upon the individuals burdened.22
13. Id. at 110.
14. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) ; Tower Realty, Inc. v. East
Detroit, 196 F.2d 710 (6th Cir. 1952).
15. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 464 (1957), quoting Lindsley v. Natural Car-
bonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
16. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding Michigan's pro-
hibition on women bartenders).
17. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). See McDonald v. Board of
Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
18. In Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1969), the Court declared that
"distinctions based upon race .... 'bear a far heavier burden of justification' than
other classifications .... "
19. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The Court in that case declared
residency requirements for welfare recipients unconstitutional, stating that "in moving
[to another state] . . . appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Id.
at 634.
20. Id. at 638 (1969) : "Since the classification here touches on the fundamental
right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter
standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest."
21. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ; Developments in the
Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1101-02 (1969).
22. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). No set of facts has yet
been presented to the Supreme Court that exhibited the "compelling interest" said to
be required.
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A. The Problem of Proof
Both the "rational basis" and "compelling interest" tests provide
useful standards for determining the constitutionality of express statu-
tory classifications. In cases like Town of Shaw, however, where the
denial of equal protection is allegedly the result of discriminatory
application of discretionary powers, 23 a court must determine what
was the actual basis for the discretionary action before it can decide
which standard to apply. Unless the existence of purposeful dis-
crimination is proven, the reviewing court should apply the "rational
basis" test. This was made clear by the Supreme Court in Swain v.
Alabama.24 In that case, a convicted rapist argued that his conviction
should be invalidated because there was racial discrimination in the
selection of the grand jury. Alabama law required that all honest,
intelligent men of esteemed integrity be placed on the list from which
the grand jury was chosen. It was alleged, however, that the county
commissioners systematically excluded blacks. The Court observed that
the administrative officials did not include the names of eligible citizens,
but instead followed a haphazard procedure which resulted in a
disproportionately low number of blacks on the jury roles. The Court
then held that, since the disparity was not the result of purposeful
discrimination, the petitioner had not been denied his fourteenth
amendment rights.
Since direct evidence that an impermissible factor was responsible
for any disparity is often unavailable, the challenger is forced to resort
to an indirect method of proving the existence of a racial criterion.
Statistical evidence has long been accepted for this purpose. As early
as 1886, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,2" statistical evidence was presented
to support an allegation that officials empowered to license wooden
23. MISS. CODE ANN. § 3374-129 (1956) provides: "The governing authorities
of municipalities shall have the power to exercise full jurisdiction in the matter of
streets, sidewalks, sewers, and parks; to open and lay out and construct the same;
and to repair, maintain, pave, sprinkle, adorn, and light the same." This section has
been construed by the Mississippi Supreme Court as not imposing any duty upon the
municipality, but merely as endowing it with the discretionary power to provide these
services. Greenville v. Queen City Lumber Co., 227 Miss. 749, 86 So. 2d 860 (1956).
24. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962), in which it
was stated :
Moreover, the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not
in itself a federal constitutional violation. Even though the statistics in this case
might imply a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated that the selection
was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification. Therefore grounds supporting a finding of a denial
of equal protection were not alleged.
Id. at 456.
25. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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laundries in San Francisco were discriminating against Chinese laundry
operators. The Supreme Court in that case agreed with the petitioner
that racial discrimination was the only explanation for the fact that
of the 280 license applications received, only the thirty belonging to
non-Chinese were granted. Likewise, in Eubanks v. Louisiana,2" the
Supreme Court concluded that statistically proven "uniform and long-
continued exclusion of Negroes" from juries, could not be attributable
to accident but, to the contrary, must have resulted from the existence
of purposeful discrimination.'
A statistical showing of a racially discriminatory effect is not,
however, conclusive proof of the existence of an impermissible racial
classification, but merely establishes a prima facie case. Establishment
of a prima facie case, it must be remembered, does not compel a decision
for either party,2" nor does it mean that the party establishing such
a case is entitled to a directed verdict.29 In cases in which racial
discrimination has been alleged, establishment of a prima facie case
will shift the burden of proof to the defendant, thus requiring him to
rebut the evidence presented."0 The Supreme Court, however, ha's
never held that the presentation of a prima facie case of racial uis-
crimination will preclude the state from rebutting the evidence so as
to refute the inference which can be drawn from the statistical data.
26. 356 U.S. 584 (1958).
27. Id. at 587. For cases involving statistical proof of longstanding discrimination,
see United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 135 (1965) ("It is apparent that the
complaint.. . charged a long-standing, carefully prepared, and faithfully observed plan
to bar Negroes from voting in the State of Mississippi .... ") ; Cassell v. Texas, 339
U.S. 282 (1950) (statistics coupled with direct testimony showing long history of
discrimination).
28. Cleveland v. Keah, 157 Ohio St. 331, 105 N.E.2d 402 (1952).
29. Rehm v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 157 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
30. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967). In Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935), for example, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether Alabama's
jury selection procedure systematically excluded qualified blacks so as to deny the
petitioner the equal protection of the laws. A prima fade case was made out through
testimony that "no negro had served on any grand or petit jury in that county within
the memory of witnesses who had lived there all their lives." 294 U.S. at 591. The
state was not required to justify this "prima facie discrimination," but rather was
allowed to come forward with evidence to show that racial discrimination was not the
reason for the absence of Negroes on its juries. The Court, after viewing all of the
evidence, reversed the court below, concluding that the state had "failed to rebut the
strong prima facie case which defendant had made." Id. at 598. Likewise, in Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940), the Court accepted the possibility of the state's rebutting
a statistical showing of discrimination in jury selection. However, after viewing all
the evidence, the Court in that case concluded that "even if [the state's evidence] were
given the greatest possible effect . . . we would still feel compelled to reverse the
decision below" [Id. at 132], which held that the evidence failed to establish racial
discrimination.
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Thus, in Wright v. Rockefeller,31 the state was able to rebut a
prima facie showing of racial discrimination. In that case, the appellants
alleged that a congressional apportionment statute was racially moti-
vated. Maps, statistics and oral evidence were offered to prove that
the plan was designed to "ghettoize" New York City's voting districts.3 2
A three-judge district court found, as a fact, that complainants had
failed to prove that the redistricting was racially motivated and the
Supreme Court affirmed, stating, "[w]here there are such conflicting
inferences one group of them cannot, because labelled as 'prima facie
proof,' be treated as conclusive on the fact finder so as to deprive him
of his responsibility to choose among disputed inferences,"33 and that
since a finding of intentional discrimination "was crucial to appellants'
case . . . their challenge cannot be sustained."34
In Town of Shaw, the plaintiffs adduced statistical evidence to
support their allegation of racial motivation 5 in the allocation of
municipal services. The district court, while not unmindful of the
import of this evidence, found the statistics unpersuasive:
Plaintiffs have compiled certain statistics which they claim
support a charge that defendants and their predecessors in office
have racially classified the black and white neighborhoods by
providing better or more complete facilities to the latter neighbor-
hoods, but they would ignore all legitimate deductions to be made
from the evidence running counter to statistical racial disparity.
But we do not understand that a court may adopt that manner
of reasoning. If actions of public officials are shown to have
rested upon rational considerations, irrespective of race or poverty,
they are not within the condemnation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and may not be properly condemned upon judicial review.
Persons or groups who are treated differently must be shown
to be similarly situated and their unequal treatment demonstrated
to be without any rational basis or based upon an invidious factor
such as race. 6
31. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
32. Id. at 54.
33. Id. at 57.
34. Id. at 58. The dissent, however, disagreed with the lower court's factual con-
clusions and asserted that the statistics showed an intent to gerrymander on a racial
basis.
35. See text accompanying notes 3 & 4 supra.
36. 303 F. Supp. at 1168. This language was consistent with the standards which
had been provided by the Fifth Circuit in prior cases. See Davis v. Georgia State Bd.
of Educ., 408 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1969). The court in that case stated: "Basic to any
complaint of denial of equal protection must be some showing that the persons or
groups being treated differently are similarly situated and that their disparate treat-
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The language of the district court is not clear; it concluded either
that plaintiffs had not presented a prima facie case of discrimination
or that the statistical "proof" had been rebutted by the state."7 The
Fifth Circuit, in its original opinion, expressly found that plaintiffs'
statistics "clearly made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination,"38
but then skipped the intermediate step of permitting the state to rebut
the statistics and leapt directly to the compelling state interest discus-
sion. Under one reading of the case, this would be proper. The Fifth
Circuit might have independently viewed plaintiffs' evidence39 and
concluded that only intentional racial discrimination could have pro-
duced the disparity in municipal services.4 ° If this were an adequate
characterization of the opinion, the decision enunciated in Hawkins
v. Town of Shaw would not significantly extend the protection of the
fourteenth amendment. A clear example of the application of the
compelling interest test to measure municipal conduct was presented
by Kennedy Park Homes Association, Inc. v. Lackawanna.4 In that
ment by the state is either without any rational basis or is based on some invidious
factor such as race." Id. at 1015.
37. The circuit court opinion did not indicate how it read the district court's
opinion, because it adopted a far different rule for the case.
38. 437 F.2d at 1288.
39. An appellate court may reverse a lower court's finding of fact pursuant to
rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if that finding is clearly erroneous.
See, e.g., United States v. LeFlore County, 371 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1967). An appellate
court may reverse the lower court's finding of an "ultimate fact" even though that
finding is not clearly erroneous. Industrial Instrument Corp. v. Foxboro Co., 307 F.2d
783 (5th Cir. 1962). An ultimate fact "is simply the result reached by processes of
legal reasoning from, or the interpretation of the legal signficance of, the evidentiary
facts." Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1954).
40. The Fifth Circuit initially seemed to recognize that a showing of affirmative
racial discrimination was necessary to trigger the compelling interest test, stating:
"'Where racial clasrsifications are involved, the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment "command a more stringent standard" in re-
viewing discretionary acts of state or local officers.. . .'" 437 F.2d at 1288 (emphasis
added), quoting Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 537 (5th Cir. 1968). Furthermore,
there are indications that the towri's evidence was insufficient to rebut the inference
of racial discrimination produced by the prima facie case. For example, the court
stated: "The record simply does not support the justification that streets were built
according to traffic needs and usage" [437 F.2d at 1289]; "[i]t is not at all clear
from the record that such a 'firm policy' [of making sewage installations in new
bi-racial areas] exists." Id. at 1290.
However, the majority rejected the findings of Judge Bell, who, in his con-
curring opinion correctly presented the equal protection test required, stating: "Facts
showing a racial classification call for one standard while a non-racial classification
calls for another." Id. at 1294. He concluded that the facts of the case indicated
the existence of a racial classification, and, therefore, a compelling interest was re-
quired as justification for the municipality's conduct.
41. 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
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case, the plaintiff Association sought judicial relief alleging that racially
discriminatory actions by the municipal government were preventing
the construction of a housing project designed to afford decent housing
to low-income families. The court, after hearing the evidence, con-
cluded that racial discrimination was at the root of the municipality's
actions,4 and, therefore, a compelling interest was required to justify
the city's conduct.4 A similar result was reached in Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority,44 in which a federal district court con-
cluded from statistical evidence that the site selection and tenant
assignment procedures for low-income housing projects were designed
to perpetuate racial segregation. The court then held that since the
Authority failed to rebut this inference of racial discrimination, the
plaintiffs were entitled to a "judgment as a matter of law."45
A careful reading of the original opinion, however, indicates
that the Fifth Circuit wished to rest its decision on the proposition
that any statistical showing of racial inequality, even absent discrimina-
tory intent, must be explained in terms of a compelling state interest. 6
That this characterization was, in fact, the rationale for the original
decision is made clear by the Fifth Circuit in its en banc opinion.47
In that discussion, the court, after stating that the record did not
disclose the existence of "bad faith, ill will or any evil motive on
the part of the town of Shaw and its public officials"4 went on to
hold that "[i]n order to prevail in a case of this type it is not
necessary to prove intent, motive or purpose to discriminate on the
part of city officials."4 9 No prior decision has gone that far. The
virtually automatic result of such a holding would be that any statute
42. Id. at 109.
43. Id. at 114.
44. 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
45. Id. at 913.
46. The court made its attitude clear at the outset when it stated: "Surely, this
was enough evidence to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The only
question that remains to be examined is whether or not these disparities can possibly
be justified by any compelling state interests." 437 F.2d at 1288.
The Fifth Circuit's new rule was made explicit later on: "In a civil rights
suit alleging racial discrimination in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment,
actual intent or motive need not be directly proved . . ." Id. at 1291-92. The court
quoted Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968),
for the proposition that "'[e]qual protection of the laws' means more than merely the
absence of governmental action designed to discriminate; * * * 'we now firmly
recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair
to private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.'" 395
F.2d at 931.
47. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, No. 29013 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 1972).
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id.
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or administrative decision that affected blacks statistically less favorably
than whites would fall, since it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
would uphold a racial classification because the state satisfied the
compelling interest test." Clearly, an alternative rule must be developed
to deal with an action that produces an effect which, on one hand,
may be explained as the neutral application of legitimate administrative
criteria, but which, on the other hand, may have been initiated solely
because of racial prejudice. 5 1
B. Substitutes for Intent to Discriminate
As noted above," direct proof of intent to discriminate is not a
necessary element of an equal protection challenge to a statute or
administrative policy neutral on its face. However, the mere fact that
a statute has an arguably harsher effect on racial minorities is not
enough to disqualify it."3
For example, in Hunter v. Erickson,' the Akron, Ohio, City
Council had amended the city charter to prevent implementation of
"any ordinance dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral discrimina-
tion in housing" 5 unless the ordinance was first approved by a majority
of the town's voters. The Supreme Court held that since the Akron
law embodied a racial classification which was aimed directly at exclud-
ing blacks and which had not been justified by the city, it unconstitu-
tionally discriminated against minorities. In James v. Valtierra,56 how-
ever, a California constitutional amendment which required a similar
50. The only case in which a racial classification was upheld as justified by
"[p]ressing public necessity" was Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944), which upheld the exclusion of Japanese-Americans from parts of California
during World War II. That decision predated the articulation of the compelling state
interest test. One authority suggests that only a military crisis - and perhaps not
even that - could today justify imposition of a burden on the basis of race. Develop-
ments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1090 (1969).
51. It can be argued that the Judges of the Fifth Circuit decided Town of Shaw
as they did because they knew full well that decisions as to apportionment of municipal
services in small-town Mississippi - as well as most other decisions there - were
made solely on the basis of race. Professor Brest suggested that the members of the
Supreme Court majority were the only people in the country to close their eyes to
the racial reason for the closing of the Jackson, Mississippi municipal swimming pools
that formed the basis of the suit in Palmer v. Thompson. Brest, Palmer v. Thompson:
An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, in 1971 THE
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 95, 101 (P. Kurland ed. 1971).
52. See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Howell, Legislative Motive and Legislative Purpose in the Invalida-
tion of a Civil Rights Statute, 47 VA. L. REV. 439, 451 (1961).
54. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
55. Id. at 386.
56. 402 US. 137 (1971).
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referendum before any low-income housing project was commenced was
held not to violate the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. The Court reasoned that since the law was "seemingly
neutral on its face" 7 and there was nothing in the record to show
that it was "aimed at a racial minority,""8 the state need not demon-
strate a compelling state interest. Furthermore, even a commentator
whose writings reflect little sympathy for the practice of racial dis-
crimination has acknowledged that "[i]t would be both impracticable
and undesirable to require decisionmakers to assure that all decisions
have an equal effect on rich and poor alike and on all races." 9
Accepting this reasonable statement to be accurate, it is necessary to
find ways to test administrative actions which appear neutral but
which affect blacks and whites differently.
Professor Brest formulated a test that would impose the com-
pelling interest requirement on any legislation or administrative classi-
fication adopted with a "suspect" motive, and automatically invalidate
one adopted with an "illicit" objective. 60  However, as that writer
admitted in his study of legislative motives, which he called "one of
the most muddled areas of our constitutional jurisprudence,"'" the
Supreme Court has expressly avoided elevating motivation to the
level of an area of permissible inquiry,62 and may have a number of
excellent reasons for so doing. 5
1. Impairment of "Fundamental Rights"
The Supreme Court, in areas other than race relations, has been
able to test statutory classifications which, although apparently neu-
57. Id. at 141.
58. Id. It is interesting to note that the lower court found that "the impact of
the law falls upon minorities." Valtierra v. Housing Authority, 313 F. Supp. 1, 5
(N.D. Cal. 1970). This finding was based upon evidence that nonwhites and Mexican-
Americans were "'over represented in the less than standard housing by greater than
four to one, and occupied nearly one-third of the deteriorating and dilapidated housing
in the County in 1960.'" Id. at 5 n.2.
59. Brest, supra note 51, at 110. See generally Ely, Legislative And Administra-
tive Motivation In Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). The en banc opinion
in Town of Shaw endorsed the principle that not every disparity in the provision of
municipal services constitutes a denial of equal protection. The Court, however, offered
no clues as to which disparities would be constitutionally suspect and which would not
60. Brest, supra note 51, at 130-31.
61. Id. at 99.
62. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
63. Brest suggested as possible reasons improper invasion of the operations of a
coequal branch of government and difficulty of probing legislative motives. Brest, supra
note 43, at 119. He credits Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949), with suggesting a third explanation: the disutility of
voiding an otherwise valid law because it was adopted with an impermissible motive.
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tral, have an adverse effect on certain groups of people. In each case,
however, in which a discriminatory effect alone has been used to strike
down a statutory classification, it was because that classification denied
equal access to a "fundamental right." An example of the application
of this doctrine is Shapiro v. Thompson.64 In that case, the Supreme
Court struck down laws requiring one year of state residence as a
prerequisite to the receipt of welfare assistance, holding that because
the effect of the classification was to penalize the exercise of the consti-
tutional right to travel it could only be justified on the basis of a
compelling state interest. A similar test was used by the Court to
declare that appellate procedures which effectively discriminated against
indigents were unconstitutional.65 The judicial philosophy in those
cases seemed to be that although a person has no constitutional right
to an appeal, 66 once such a procedure is provided by the state, the right
to make use of the procedure becomes as fundamental as the right to
a trial, and, therefore, any classification which impairs that right must
be justified on the basis of a substantial state interest.6 Likewise, the
notion that fundamental rights are being impaired can be used to
explain decisions declaring unconstitutional laws requiring the payment
of poll taxes6 and court costs69 as well as those affecting the right of
a political party to be listed on the ballot.70
64. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
65. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
66. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
67. Justice Black, in his plurality opinion in Griflin v. Illinois stated:
Surely no one would contend that either a State or the Federal Government
could constitutionally provide that defendants unable to pay court costs in advance
should be denied the right to plead not guilty or to defend themselves in court....
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the poor
the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies the
poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to pay
the costs in advance.
351 U.S. at 17-18.
68. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
69. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Although this case was decided
on due process grounds [Id. at 377], it can be easily explained in terms of the equal
protection rationale used to invoke the compelling interest test. That is, since Con-
necticut's law infringed upon a fundamental right, it became constitutionally suspect
and, as such, could only be justified on the basis of a compelling interest. For example,
the Court stated that "the State's refusal to admit these appellants to its courts . . .
must be regarded as the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be heard . . .
and, in the absence of a sufficient countervailing justification for the State's action, a
denial of due process." Id. at 380-81.
70. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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Thus, there exists a mechanism whereby the courts may judge
the constitutionality of a classification by its effect alone. However,
before an apparently neutral law may be declared invalid, it is essential
that the court hold that the right being impaired is fundamental.
It is conceivable that access to sewers, street lights and paved
roads could be considered "fundamental rights," but it is unlikely that
the courts will so find in the near future. In every case in which effect
was used to strike down a classification, the right impaired had its
origins in the Constitution itself. For example, the constitutional right
to travel, enunciated by the Court in United States v. Guest,7 was
impaired by the statute struck down in Shapiro v. Thompson;72 the
right "to associate for the advancement of political beliefs"7" was
impaired by the Ohio election laws which were declared unconstitutional
in Williams v. Rhodes; 4 the right to vote in congressional elections,
expressly conferred by the Constitution, was impaired by Virginia's
poll tax, which was set aside by the Supreme Court in Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections;75 and the adverse effect upon the
right to a fair trial was responsible for the decisions in Griffin v.
Illinois76 and Douglas v. California.77 Furthermore, the unwillingness
of the Court, in deciding school desegregation cases for over fifteen
years, to term education a fundamental right7" indicates a judicial reluc-
tance to expand unnecessarily the concept of fundamental rights. Thus,
it appears that although the fundamental rights doctrine is a viable
mechanism for testing the constitutionality of "neutral" statutes, its use
in resolving situations analogous to that in Town of Shaw would be
inappropriate.
71. 383 U.S. 745 (1966). The Court in this case unambiguously recognized that
this right has its roots in the Constitution, although the exact provision from which it
stems has been a source of disagreement. The various origins of this right have been
held to include the privileges and immunities clauses of both the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, the commerce clause, or the fifth amendment due process clause. See
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 (1969).
72. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
73. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
74. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
75. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
76. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
77. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
78. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971),
in declaring unconstitutional California's method of financing its educational system
through the taxation of property was the first case to hold that education was a
fundamental right. As that court noted, however, the Supreme Court's decision in
the first Brown case strongly suggested that education was a fundamental interest
of society.
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2. Analogizing to School Desegregation Cases
In the years following the school desegregation mandate of
Brown v. Board of Education,"9 courts have on numerous occasions
invalidated facially neutral actions which tended to thwart the in-
tegration of educational facilities. Thus, the closing of all public
schools,"0 the establishment of "freedom of choice" enrollment plans8
and mass dismissals of teachers when formerly all black high schools
were closed" have all been voided in cities in which a dual educational
system had been maintained either by statute or by administrative
action.8 3 No similar decision has been rendered by the Supreme Court
in a locality in which the schools had never been segregated by law.84
Analogizing to the situation in Town of Shaw, a court could hold
that if services had been, at an earlier date, provided by law only to
whites, continued disparities not mandated by law could be struck
down. If, on the other hand, the disparity in services had not been
created by official acts of discrimination, Brown and its progeny could
not be relied upon to support a corrective order.
None of the school desegregation cases, however, are authority
for the proposition that proof of a statistically adverse effect on a
racial minority will invalidate an otherwise constitutional action. Thus,
the decisions requiring certain actions to overcome de jure school
desegregation will not aid a court in answering the threshold question
of whether a disparity in municipal services was caused in the first
instance by de jure discrimination.
3. The Test of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
Perhaps the best way to deal with problems similar to those
presented in Town of Shaw would be for the courts to formulate a
79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
80. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
81. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
82. Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966).
83. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). De jure segregation
"adverts to segregation specifically mandated by law or by public policy pursued
under color of law." Id. at 493.
84. See Craggett v. Board of Educ., 234 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Bell
v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aft'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.
1963) (relief denied on grounds that segregation was de facto) ; Fiss, Racial Imbal-
ance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1965) ;
Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools - Part II: The General Northern
Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 157, 176-77 (1963). But see Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) (finding the distinction between de jure and de facto segre-
gation irrelevant).
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third test for those statutes and rules which are neutral on their
faces but have disparate effects on discrete racial groups - a test more
stringent than the traditional "any conceivable state of facts" per-
mitted to justify some state statutes, but more realistic than the com-
pelling state interest test, which has never been satisfied. Such a test
could be invoked as a matter of law against any statute which has a
demonstrably harsher effect on a racial minority - that is, under which
a prima facie case of racial discrimination can be proven - but which
cannot be shown to have resulted from intentional race discrimination.
It was precisely such a test that was used by the Supreme Court,
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,85 to declare that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964s" prohibited employers from using hiring criteria
which discriminated on the basis of race if they were unrelated to the
requirements of the specific job to be filled. Although the Court in
that case was interpreting a statute, the principles enunciated are equally
applicable in construing the requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
The problems inherent in effecting equal employment opportunity
are remarkably similar to those encountered by courts which have
been required to determine whether administrative actions measured
up to equal protection standards. In both areas the potential for abuse
is great. For example, by carefully selecting ostensibly neutral criteria,
an employer can ensure that his work force will remain predominantly
white. Likewise, by choosing the appropriate nonracial criteria, admin-
istrative officials can effectively direct the benefits of their discretion
toward the white community. Presumably it was recognition of this
problem which led the Fifth Circuit, en banc, to emphasize "that the
arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to
private rights and to public interest as the perversity of a willful
scheme."'8 7 However, the mere recognition of this possibility does not
necessitate that a statistical disparity be justified on the basis of a
compelling state interest.
The test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs, that the
employment criteria must bear a reasonable relationship to the job
requirements, could easily have been adapted to resolve the issue pre-
85. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For a discussion of this case and its effect on employ-
ment practices, see Note, Employment Discrimination: The Burden is on Business,
31 MD. L. REv. 255 (1971).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970).
87. No. 29013, at 2 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 1972) (en banc decision), quoting Norwalk
CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968). This same
quotation was used in Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n, Inc. v. Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108,
114 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971), to justify a command that
a city provide sewage facilities.
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sented by Town of Shaw. That is, once the challenger had demonstrated
a statistical disparity on the basis of race, the burden would shift to
the responsible officials to prove that any discretionary decisions were
reasonably related to achieving legitimate objectives. The mere fact
that the criteria used were racially neutral would not justify their use.
This "middle test" of a demonstrably reasonable relationship to
a nondiscriminatory purpose would advance the policy of ending racial
discrimination without attempting Professor Brest's impossible task
of "assur [ing] that all decisions have an equal effect ... on all races. '""8
CONCLUSION
The result in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw was necessary. As the
Fifth Circuit insisted at the outset:
Referring to a portion of town or a segment of society asbeing "on the other side of the tracks" has for too long been a
familiar expression to most Americans. Such a phrase immediately
conjures up an area characterized by poor housing, overcrowded
conditions and, in short, overall deterioration. While there may
be many reasons why such areas exist in nearly all of our cities,
one reason that cannot be accepted is the discriminatory provision
of municipal services based on race. 9
88. Another alternative would be to pin the label "compelling" on interests that
seem to be far less than that. The Fifth Circuit suggested such a possibility in Town
of Shaw, stating "even if we assume that such criteria as traffic usage, need and width
constitute compelling state interests, they were not applied equally to both black and
white neighborhoods." 437 F.2d at 1289. The Supreme Court's enunciation of the
compelling interest test has seemed to anticipate something more significant than
traffic needs.
A recent Supreme Court decision suggested another approach to knotty equal
protection problems. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 40 U.S.L.W. 4303 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1972),
the Court held that a Massachusetts statute barring distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried persons denied equal protection of the laws because it provided dissimilar
treatment for persons similarly situated. While the plurality opinion purported to be
measuring the statute by the less stringent test of rationality [Id. at 4306], Justice
Brennan dissected at length the state's alleged interest in deterrence of fornication,
protection of health and prevention of contraception before finding each basis uncon-
vincing. The decision can be read to invite careful scrutiny of the asserted rational
bases for classifications impinging on areas of personal, rather than economic, life.
However, this is in marked contrast to the position taken by the Court only two years
ago. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court permitted Maryland
to justify imposing maxima on families receiving welfare grants on the basis of four
asserted interests, all of which were subject to serious question and all of which had
indeed been rejected by a three-judge district court. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F.
Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1968).
89. 437 F.2d at 1287.
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A number of writers have been understandably captivated by the new
rule enunciated by the Fifth Circuit. A similar suit has been filed
in Washington, D.C.,9 and others are probably contemplated.
Unfortunately, the decision in Town of Shaw can be classified as
the right remedy for the wrong case; in short, it is bad law. If the
town's actions are classified as products of an administrative decision
fair on its face, clearly the decision must fall, for while effective
disparities between blacks and whites may have existed, a showing
that the actions resulted from purposeful discrimination was not
made, nor was it required. On the facts it found, in the current state
of the law, the proper test was that which was applied by the district
court: if there was a rational, nonracial basis for what had in fact
occurred, there was no violation of the equal protection clause. If
the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the facts found by the lower court,
it should have, as was suggested by Judge Bell in his concurring
opinion, declared that court's findings to be clearly erroneous and
then invoked the compelling interest test to strike down purposefully
discriminatory conduct.9" The Fifth Circuit, however, by failing to
separate its findings of fact from its conclusions of law has, in effect,
added a new fundamental liberty to the rights of man; standing beside
such constitutional rights as the freedoms of speech and religion now
stands a new right - the right to have a sewer.
90. See, e.g., Ellington & Jones, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw: The Court as City
Manager, 5 GA. L. REv. 734 (1971); Fessler & Haar, Beyond the Wrong Side of
the Tracks: Municipal Services in the Interstices of Procedure, 6 HARV. CIV. LIB.-
Civ. RIGHTS L. REv. 441 (1971); Note, Equal Protection: The Right to Equal
Municipal Services, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 568 (1971) ; 48 DENVER L.J. 286 (1971) ;
49 J. URBAN L. 432 (1971) ; Comment, Equal Protection in the Urban Environment:
The Right to Equal Municipal Services, 46 TUL. L. REv. 496 (1971) ; Note, Equal
Protection Across the Tracks - Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 32 U. PiTT. L. REV. 555
(1971) ; 6 U. RrcH. L. REV. 141 (1971).
91. Burner v. Washington, Civil No. 242-71 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 28, 1971). And
see Selmont Improvement Ass'n v. Dallas County Comm'n, Civil No. 6752-71-P
(S.D. Ala., Feb. 2, 1972), which found Town of Shaw authoritative in a far less
persuasively discriminatory situation.
92. This is not to say that reaching the finding of clearly erroneous would have
been easy. See parts II and III of the dissent of Judge Roney on rehearing. Hawkins
v. Town of Shaw, No. 29013, at 19-24 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 1972).
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